Amending Title VII to Eradicate Discrimination Based on Religious Apparel by Hassan, Rabia Mariam
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
5-1-2013
Amending Title VII to Eradicate Discrimination
Based on Religious Apparel
Rabia Mariam Hassan
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Hassan, Rabia Mariam, "Amending Title VII to Eradicate Discrimination Based on Religious Apparel" (2013). Law School Student
Scholarship. 234.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/234
Amending Title VII to Eradicate Discrimination based on Religious Apparel 
 
Rabia Hassan 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: 
Sex-based discrimination in the workplace is not novel or commonplace.  After decades 
of struggle, the Federal government finally recognized that discrimination in the workplace was a 
severe and pervasive problem that was repugnant to the ideals espoused in the U.S. Constitution.  
Attempting to remedy this, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (“Title 
VII”)1, prohibiting discrimination in the workplace based upon classifications of sex, race, color, 
religion or national origin.  While there is undoubted consensus that Title VII revolutionized and 
served as a “linchpin”2 of employment discrimination law, the shortcomings present in the 
legislation became readily apparent.   
First, the protections of Title VII only apply to “employers with 15 employees or more.”3  
While this targets large to mid-size businesses and brings them under the purview of the law to 
prevent employment discrimination, small businesses and domestic workers are not covered.
4
  
Second, the application of Title VII to regulate and police unlawful employment practices and 
employment discrimination occurs through disparate treatment and disparate impact, both of 
                                                            
1
  See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000 et seq. (LexisNexis 2012). 
2
  See KATHERINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER and LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 
61 (Aspen, 5th ed. 2010) (describing the central and vital role accorded to Title VII in employment discrimination 
law, both on the Federal and state level).  Each state has an anti-discrimination law which is modeled on part, if not 
completely on Title VII.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5-1 (West 2012). 
3   See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (LexisNexis 2012). 
4   See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 505-506 (2006); Wein v. Sun, 936 F. Supp. 282, 283 (E.D.Pa. 
1996). 
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which only address forms of discrimination which fall within the specific categories set out in 
the statute.
5
  In general disparate treatment focuses on banning employment discrimination 
which occurs through the “inconsistent application of rules and policies to one group over 
another,” usually members of a protected class.6  Disparate impact instead focuses on outlawing 
legislation and policies which “results when rules applied to all employees have a different and 
more inhibiting effect on…minority groups than on the majority.”7  Title VII allows for plaintiffs 
to bring employment discrimination claims based on sex.  However, if a plaintiff is unable to 
demonstrate that an employer’s actions are motivated by an intent to discriminate against a 
particular sex, or have an impact on a particular sex, their Title VII claim will most likely fail.   
Discrimination claims which do not neatly fall within the “disparate treatment” or 
“disparate impact” theories of Title VII, cannot be litigated against under Title VII.  Therefore, a 
vast array of plaintiffs are denied Title VII remedies based on otherwise legitimate claims of 
employment discrimination based on the categories specified under Title VII.  This is 
particularly apparent in appearance discrimination claims.
8
  While women have always faced 
some form of appearance discrimination,
9
 women who constitute minorities face this to a greater 
degree, not only socially but also in the workplace, as they are “[h]eld to idealized standards of 
Anglo-American features and to [such] grooming standards.”10  Holding women of minority 
groups to such standards in the United States, enables employers to discriminate against them on 
                                                            
5   See id. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k) (LexisNexis 2012).  
6   See Equal Employment Opportunity Terminology, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., (Dec. 04, 2012), 
http://www.archives.gov/eeo/terminology.html. 
7 See id.  
8   See infra Part II. 
9   See Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2009)  (arguing that 
discrimination based upon appearance is invidious and as pervasive as other forms of discrimination prohibited by 
Congress, because it stems from homogenous societal norms of what is ‘attractive’). 
10   See id. at 1053. 
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the basis of religion and national origin but without being reprimanded because discrimination 
based on appearance does not fall within the scope of Title VII.   
The gaps within the framework of Title VII, while problematic in general, prove 
especially problematic during times of social upheaval, such as after September 11, 2001.
11
  
After 9/11, the backlash against Muslims and those who appeared to “look” Muslim increased. 
This occurred in the employment context as employers further regulated not only security 
clearance and access employees would receive based on their name, but also their dress 
standards.
12
  While issues of national origin and religion are relevant, sex was particularly 
impacted in appearance-based policies initiated by employers, by the sole fact that a majority of 
those targeted were women.  Given the compelling argument articulated by Deborah Rhodes 
regarding the overarching discrimination based on appearance, both men and women face, albeit 
to a larger degree women, this paper examines appearance discrimination in the context of a 
watershed event, such as 9/11.   
The political and social ramifications after 9/11 not only give credence to the presence of 
appearance discrimination, but also point to the deficiencies in Title VII,  as the latter fails to 
address new forms of employment discrimination which discriminate against individuals through 
a combination of traits.
13
  Because sex stereotyping informs the workplace environment, 
                                                            
11   See Sandra R. McCandless & Khoa Ngo, Employment Discrimination on the Basis of National Origin and 
Religion in the Post 9/11 Era, A.B.A., Jul. 2008, at 2. 
12    See id. at 4-8. 
13   See infra Part III, (discussing the theory of Intersectionality as it pertains to race and gender;  see, e,g., 
DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, 413 F. Supp 142, 142-145 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Moore v., Hughes Helicopters, 708 
F.2d 475, 475-486 (9th Cir. 1983).  While Courts have discussed whether or not a viable nexus exists between race 
and gender, this paper argues that an equally compelling nexus exists between religion and gender.  Recognizing 
appearance discrimination as a viable form of discrimination is necessary in order to demonstrate the interaction 
between the religious and sex-based identities of individuals). 
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appearance discrimination is on the rise and particularly against Muslims post 9/11.
14
  This paper 
proposes that one way to restrict the impact of appearance discrimination and curb the use of 
new forms of discrimination is amend Title VII.  The amendment should prohibit the use of 
religious apparel by employers as a factor in designing standards of professionalism.  The 
amendment would recognize the pervasiveness of appearance discrimination and thus widen the 
scope of anti-discrimination law to better protect the rights of minority groups. 
 
Part I:  Title VII and Its Shortcomings 
Title VII assesses unlawful employment discrimination through the paradigm of two 
arguably restrictive theories:  disparate treatment and disparate impact.  Disparate treatment 
discrimination targets “employment rules or decisions that treat an employee less favorably than 
others because of the employee’s race, sex, religion or national origin.”15  In the context of sex-
based employment discrimination, disparate treatment cases generally appear as pretext
16
 or 
mixed-motive claims
17
, where the burden of proof is always on the plaintiff to demonstrate that 
the negative employment decision directed by the employer towards the employee, was 
overwhelmingly because of the employee’s sex.   
                                                            
14   See McCandless & Ngo, supra note 12, at 3-4. 
15   See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 2, at 61-62. 
16   See id. at 63-70  (indicating the classic treatment of pre-text disparate treatment cases by the Federal Courts 
through Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992).  Once a plaintiff asserts that an 
employer’s adverse action was because of the employee’s sex, in order to shift the burden back to the plaintiff, the 
employer must demonstrate that the employment decision stems from a non-discriminatory reason.  In order to rebut 
the presumption created by the employer, the plaintiff must then show that the non-discriminatory reason is but a 
“pretext” for the underlying or real motive of sex-discrimination). 
17   See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 2, at 62 and 70-74 (showing the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of a 
mixed-motive disparate treatment through Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, U.S. 228 (1989).  Once a plaintiff asserts 
that an employer’s employment decision was based on discriminatory and non-discriminatory reasons, the employee 
must further show that it would have taken the same course of action). 
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Although many employment discrimination cases are largely the result of sex 
stereotyping, it is not prohibited by the Federal Courts in either a disparate treatment analysis or 
a disparate impact analysis.
18
  In the Court’s dissent in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, along with Justices Kennedy and Scalia noted that even though 
“Title VII creates no independent cause of action for sex stereotyping…evidence of sex-
stereotyping…is relevant [because it goes towards affirming or disproving] discriminatory intent 
[and thus whether or not] the discrimination caused the plaintiff harm.”19  Proving discriminatory 
intent in disparate treatment cases is difficult without giving considerable weight to sex-
stereotypes, other than in cases where the discrimination is so pervasive and apparent.   
Under the disparate impact theory of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show 
“that a facially neutral job requirement or policy disproportionately affects women and that this 
requirement or policy is not related to job performance.”20  In these instances, there is no 
requirement for a plaintiff to demonstrate that the policy reflects discriminatory intent on the part 
of the employer.  In order to refute disparate impact claims, an employer needs to either refute 
the claim by presenting facts supporting the policy’s nexus with job performance, or by 
demonstrating that the facially neutral job requirement is justified as a business necessity.
21
   
Within disparate treatment theory, sex-stereotyping is also a problem.  First, employers 
can assert a bona fide occupational qualification
22
 and easily shift the burden of proof back onto 
the plaintiff.  Second, in order to assess whether or not policies placed unequal burdens on a 
                                                            
18   See Equal Employment Opportunity Terminology, supra note 6 and 7. 
19   See BARTLETT & RHODE,  supra note 6, at74. 
20   See id. at 61-62. 
21   See BARTLETT & RHODE,  supra note 2, at 61-62. 
22   See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009 (stating generally that a bona fide occupational qualification is an 
affirmative defense to discrimination where a sex-based requirement or restriction is permitted because it is essential 
to the business operations of an employer). 
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group based on their sex, invidious forms of discrimination such as appearance discrimination 
cannot be adequately addressed.
23
  In Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating, Inc., the Court held that 
the employer’s policy requiring female employees to wear make-up did not constitute sex-based 
employment discrimination under Title VII.
24
   The majority justified its reasoning by stating that 
the policy did not “[i]ndicate any discriminatory or sexually stereotypical intent on the part of 
Harrah’s [and instead conformed with] an overall apparel, appearance and grooming policy that 
applies largely to both men and women.”25   
The dissent disagreed, asserting instead that the grooming policy implemented by 
Harrah’s, the “Personal Best” program, placed an unequal burden on the plaintiff, as it was 
motivated by the employer’s sex stereotyping, reflective sex stereotyping held by society.26  
Furthermore, the dissent considered that “Harrah’s…policy that required women to conform to a 
sex stereotype by wearing full make up [to be] sufficient ‘direct evidence’ of discrimination.”27  
The dissent highlighted the nuanced form of sex discrimination exercised by Harrah’s, which the 
majority had failed to recognize.  Harrah’s “Personal Best” grooming policy did in fact 
disproportionately impact women as opposed to men.   
The separate requirements, viewed individually, indicate broader gender-stereotyping 
which is dangerous because it suggests “[t]o the public that [without such a grooming policy] 
women would be unable to achieve a neat, attractive and [therefore] professional appearance.”28  
In addition, while men and women are both held to community-based grooming standards, the 
                                                            
23   See BARTLETT & RHODE,  supra note 2, at 83-91(asserting that disparate impact of employer policies are viewed 
in the context of overall community standards as viewed in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 
1104 (9th Cir. 2006)).   
24   See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 25, at 87-88. 
25   See id. at 88. 
26    See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 25, at 88-89. 
27   See id. at 89. 
28   See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 2, at 90. 
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fact that both must maintain neat and attractive appearances does not equally burden each sex, to 
achieve such an outcome.  As discussed in the second dissent “…the application of makeup is an 
intricate and painstaking process that requires considerable time and care [unlike] the time it 
would take a man to shave.”29  Requiring women to undergo a complete transformation of their 
facial appearance in order to comply with an employer’s grooming standards is both burdensome 
and demeaning, given that the judicial system is affirming blatant sex-stereotyping in the 
workplace.   
In sum, the current structure of Title VII and its application place an unequal burden on 
women.  Sex stereotyping has different consequences and expectations for women and men, 
which is neither cured under a disparate theory framework nor a disparate impact framework.  
This results in women facing a new more nuanced form of discrimination, which Title VII does 
not protect against:  appearance based discrimination.   
 
Part II: Appearance Discrimination as an Invidious Form of Discrimination 
The persistence of appearance discrimination best shown in Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Company, Inc., is reflective of the deficiencies present in the overall structure of Title 
VII.  By intentionally failing to recognize appearance discrimination as a separate and pervasive 
form of sex-based discrimination, the judiciary legitimizes the stereotype that women’s faces, 
unlike men’s faces, are “…incomplete and…unprofessional” without full makeup.”30  A 
                                                            
29   See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 2, at 91 (asserting that while both applying makeup and shaving constitute 
daily rituals performed by both women and men, the fact that they constitute daily rituals is the extent of their 
similarities.  Any comparison conducted to examine the burden experienced by each sex in carrying out the 
abovementioned tasks would not be accurate, because applying makeup every day is more time and labor intensive 
compared to shaving). 
30  See id. at 88. 
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discussion on appearance discrimination is relevant because it informs community standards and 
expectations, regarding professional appearance and conduct in a workplace environment.  The 
legal consequences of such expectations contribute to the proliferation of new forms of 
employment discrimination.   
The Significance of Appearance in Forming Community Biases: 
Discrimination based upon appearance is “[a]t least widespread as other forms of 
prohibited bias.”31  It offends both equal opportunity and individual dignity when used to 
discriminate against individuals in the workplace.
32
  Not only do such stereotypes “…reflect 
overbroad or inaccurate generalizations [but] they [are] self-perpetuating.”33  Therefore, group 
disadvantages become compounded and are reinforced.  In particular, members of minority 
groups, faced with discrimination based on their appearance, are “[p]revent[ed] from developing 
their full capacities,” on top of discrimination already directed towards them as a result of either 
their race, gender, class, disability or sexual orientation.
34
  As Rhode asserts, studies demonstrate 
that the appearance standards to which minorities are held and considered ideal are Anglo-
American features.
35
  Cultural standards or hallmarks of beauty such as African American 
weaves or other hairstyle choices are therefore no longer recognized as attractive or professional, 
as they are not considered “neat or well-groomed.”36  Under Rhode’s conception of appearance 
                                                            
31   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1060. 
32   See id. at 1050-1051 (stating that “…in many contexts, appearance bears no relationship to competence and 
discrimination on that basis undermines values pertaining to both efficiency and equity”). 
33   See Rhode, supra, note 6, at 1051. 
34   See ,e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L. J. 2313, 2359-2360 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2428-2429 (1994). 
35   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1053 (quoting Tracey Owens Patton, Hey Girl, Am I More Than My Hair?: African 
American Women and Their Struggles with Beauty, Body Image and Hair, 18 NWSA J. 24, 25 (2006)). 
36   See, e.g,. Imani Perry, Buying White Beauty, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 579 (2006);  Hollins v, Atlantic Co., 
188 F.3d 652, 655-657 (6th Cir. 1999) (where hairstyles now had to be approved by an African American 
employee’s white supervisor and only sanctioned hairstyles would be considered “neat”.   The sanctioned hairstyles 
were those already worn by white women workers). 
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discrimination, Harrah’s “Personal Best” grooming policy would constitute unlawful 
employment discrimination under the theory of appearance discrimination, because it classifies 
attractiveness, professionalism and self-worth based on one set of preferences.
37
  What is 
particularly troubling and dangerous about discrimination based on appearance is that it creates 
biases which serve as the basis for legal treatment or restriction of individuals, reflecting either 
an affirmation or disapproval for such choices, which have punitive ramifications.
38
  Biases 
inform and affect the treatment of individuals in the workplace, as innate feelings and 
assumptions cannot be relegated to the private sphere.
39
   
Appearance Policies Reflect an Overall Preference towards the Anglo-American Look: 
 
Employer policies regarding grooming and appearance standards not only reflect an 
inherent bias about appearance, but also about how appearance informs other characteristics held 
by workers, such as professionalism or competence.  Despite the multiculturalism and diversity 
in the workplace, Anglo-American appearance ideals have become the norm and therefore 
constitute the appearance of the ideal worker.  Appearance discrimination therefore also 
perpetuates the idea of cultural and religious diversity as being the antithesis of professionalism.  
This is problematic in that it not only discriminates based upon one, single and restrictive notion 
of professionalism, but “[r]equires conforming to conventional norms [that] infringe [on] 
                                                            
37  See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1035-1036 (asserting that regardless of variety of cultures which comprise the United 
States, “the globalization of mass media and information technology has brought an increasing convergence in the 
standards of attractiveness”). 
38   See id. at 1037-1039  (stating how bias’ on appearance become ingrained from childhood and persist into 
adulthood.  Ramifications to individual choices and beliefs occur when such bias’ “skew judgments about 
competence and job performance”); David Landy & Harold Sigall, Beauty is Talent:  Task Evaluation as a Function 
of the Performer’s Physical Attractiveness, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.  299 (1974); Nicole 
39   See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Sex Pus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women Workers, 81 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 79, 91 (2003) (stating that bias’ towards older women workers led to ageism in the workplace and reinforcing 
the idea that bias’ permeate into the public sphere). 
10 
 
individual autonomy.”40  While some individuals may not view their appearance or matters 
relating to grooming as vehicles of self-expression or reflective of core-held beliefs, several 
individuals, a majority of whom constitute minority populations in the United States, view 
outward appearance as “[c]entral to their personal…religious, racial and gender affiliations”.41  A 
failure on the part of employers to accommodate self-expression by regulating the appearance of 
individuals, impinges on their rights of self expression given in the Constitution and is both de 
jure and de facto unlawful employment discrimination.
42
   
 
Lack of Legal Remedies for Appearance-based Discrimination Claims: 
Challenges brought against both cultural and sex-stereotyping fail however, because of 
the narrow and restrictive view of the categories of discrimination.  The case of Rogers v. 
American Airlines, highlights the need to reform and re-conceptualize the federal law’s 
understanding of discrimination in order to account for discrimination based on appearance.  
Doing so would in turn, curtail unlawful employment discrimination perpetrated by employers 
which go unprosecuted because they do not conform to the standard forms of discrimination 
recognized by Title VII.  In Rogers v. American Airlines, the Southern District of New York held 
that the airline’s prohibition on braided cornrows did not constitute either race or sex 
discrimination as “…the plaintiff had not demonstrated ‘that an all-braided hair style is worn 
exclusively or predominantly by black people.’”43  By failing to recognize the significance or 
importance of braided hair to the African American woman employee, the Court denied the 
                                                            
40   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1058 (re-asserting the idea espoused by Susan Sontag that individual self-expression 
stems from closely held beliefs). 
41   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1058. 
42   See ,e.g., Anita L. Allen, Undressing Difference: The Hijab in the West, 23 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 208, 
211-216 (2008)  (indicating the importance of the headscarf to the cultural and religious identity of Muslims and 
showing it is akin to the yarmulke to those of the Jewish religion). 
43   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1059 (citing the majority’s holding in Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 229 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
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plaintiff’s cultural beliefs and right to self-expression solely on the grounds that she could not 
demonstrate that hair braiding was an exclusive or dominant preference of African American 
females and therefore could not qualify as a closely-held belief.
44
  This case is reflective of the 
general treatment given to claims which do not neatly fit within the already prescribed categories 
of discrimination.  In claims involving grooming policies which impact the beliefs and practices 
of religious groups for instance, Courts have been increasingly deferential to the business 
justifications provided by employers, in denying employee requests for accommodations to wear 
head coverings (hijabs) or maintain beards.
45
  The failure to “question the sex stereotypes 
underlying conventional ‘community standards’ and to demand a reasonable business 
justification from employers,’” allows for appearance discrimination claims to persist.46   
Employer Justifications for Implementing Appearance-based Policies and Why Such 
Justifications Fail:  
 
The general argument used to legitimize discrimination based on appearance relies on 
“[e]mployee attractiveness [which is] an effective selling point and [are] part of an employer’s 
strategy to ‘brand’ the seller through a certain look.”47  Employers who have brought forth such 
an argument essentially articulate a standard of beauty which captures the “classic American” 
look.
48
  Such policies blatantly constitute race, ethnic, sex and age-based discrimination and are 
                                                            
44   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1059 (citing Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231-232); see e.g. Paulette M. Caldwell, A 
Hairpiece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 41 DUKE L.J. 365, 371-372 (criticizing the Court’s 
upholding of employer policies which banned hair pieces in the workplace because it symbolizes the legitimization 
of sex and race-based discriminatory policies based upon a failure to understand the cultural importance of 
appearance). 
45   See e.g. EEOC v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02 C 6172 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2002) (order of resolution); EEOC v. Fed. 
Express Corp., CV100-50 (S.D. Ga. May 24, 2001) (consent decree); see generally infra Part III. 
46   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1077. 
47   See id. at 1064. 
48   See Steven Greenhouse, Going for the Look, but Risking Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at A12  
(where Abercrombie & Fitch’s policy of hiring workers that fit its look policy rendered its sales staff being 
composed of  “young, trendy and not too ethnic” workers); see also Steven Greenhouse, Abercrombie & Fitch Bias 
Case is Settled, N.Y. TIMES,  Nov. 17, 2004, at A16 (indicating that due to its discriminatory hiring policy, based on 
12 
 
thus prohibited under federal law.  However, unless an employer’s policy blatantly discriminates 
based on the aforementioned categories, Courts are unlikely to find that employers violated Title 
VII, even if “look” policies are based upon double standards or serve to perpetuate them, even 
when such policies bear no apparent relationship to job performance.
49
    
Critics who oppose recognizing appearance discrimination as a viable form of 
discrimination, state additionally, that it is too amorphous to police.  Their main concern is that 
appearance and grooming practices are extremely subjective, making it near impossible for 
Courts to determine when an employer is discriminating based upon such practices.
50
  Increased 
litigation costs, enhanced judicial activism and the detrimental cost to “truly” invidious forms of 
discrimination
51
 are concerns which critics feel demonstrate that more harm than good will occur 
by amending Title VII to recognize appearance discrimination or concomitantly, authorizing 
appearance-discrimination statutes.  In fact, several federal judges such as Richard Posner, have 
asserted that the “law on sex stereotypes has already ‘gone off the tracks’ in reasoning,”52 and 
“federal judges have too much to do to become embroiled in petty disputes about where women 
can and can’t wear pants.”53 The aforementioned remarks trivialize the issue and therefore fail to 
recognize that while certain employer “look” policies can be trivial, when such policies take into 
account stereotypes and inhibit individuals self-expression based upon their race, religion or 
ethnicity, their constitutional rights are violated.   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
its appearance policy, Abercrombie & Fitch was forced to settle claims against it for race discrimination after it 
agreed to “integrate its staff and advertisements”). 
49   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1065  (specifically alluding to Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 
1106-1107 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
50   See id. at 1068-1069  (asserting the holding of the Court in Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 914 (D. 
Nev. 1993)  where it stated that “no Court can be expected to create a standard on such vagaries as attractiveness”). 
51   See Rhode supra note 6, at 1069. 
52   See id. (quoting Judge Posner in Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066-1067 (7th Cir. 
2003)). 
53   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1069 (quoting Rappaport v. Katz, 380 F. Supp. 808, 811-812 (S.D.N.Y.1974)). 
13 
 
Those who criticize appearance discrimination legislation put forth additional arguments, 
all of which are not sustainable.  First, these critics argue that “[p]rejudice based on appearance 
is more natural and harder to eradicate than other forms of bias,”54 which studies demonstrate is 
a false assumption.
55
  Shifts in popular opinion have been driven in part by legal interventions 
regarding other forms of discrimination, which previously were considered commonplace in 
society.
56
  There is therefore no reason to assume that initiatives prohibiting appearance 
discrimination would not cause similar shifts in social thinking and perceptions. 
Second, they argue that “[p]rohibiting [appearance] discrimination would erode support 
for other civil rights legislation.”57  This argument loses legal weight because in cities, counties 
and states which passed ordinances prohibiting appearance discrimination, there were no severe 
repercussions or mass frivolous legal claims brought forth.
58
  In fact in one of the only states 
which passed a statutory ordinance prohibiting appearance discrimination, Michigan, out of 30 
complaints of violations of appearance discrimination, only 1 went to Court.
59
  At a minimum, 
by recognizing appearance discrimination as a form of unlawful discrimination, the law would 
“…provide a forum to air injustice [that] can be a powerful catalyst for social change”.60  It may 
take time for legislation to translate into changing attitudes, but formally prohibiting appearance 
discrimination is a first crucial step in starting the process.  Additionally, by allowing employees 
                                                            
54   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1070. 
55   See id. (citing Marilynn B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, INTERGROUP RELATIONS in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 554 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998), who state that the preferences individuals have 
regarding race, sex and ethnicity are also “deep rooted”). 
56   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1071 (giving examples of legal intervention which resulted in changes in attitudes 
and practices towards African Americans through Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education, attitudes 
towards the disabled through the Americans Disabilities Act and attitudes towards gay and lesbian relationships 
through statutes authorizing civil unions and domestic partnerships). 
57   See id. 
58   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1071 and 1088-1089 (from claims of appearance discrimination lodged in Santa 
Cruz, San Francisco, Madison, District of Columbia and Michigan). 
59   See id. (citing figures based on complaints lodged under MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 37.2202(1)(A) (West 
2008)). 
60   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1071. 
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to bring claims against employers for discriminatory grooming and appearance policies, the idea 
of litigation and negative media coverage will move employers to settle and end such policies.
61
    
In sum, appearance is a viable category through which discrimination persists in the 
workplace.  While it influences and informs preferences in the private sphere, when it enters into 
the public sphere it is subject to legal scrutiny.  The lack of regulation enables employers to use 
appearance based policies to guide workplace values on professionalism.  This fuels invidious 
forms of discrimination and helps create new manifestations of discrimination which do not 
neatly fall within the Title VII proscribed categories.  Most apparently, appearance policies and 
standards of grooming have been influenced by a preference towards Anglo-American 
appearance.  Individuals who do not conform to such standards are susceptible to biases and 
preconceived notions because they possess a different look, making the lack of regulation of 
appearance based policies dangerous.   
 
Part III:  Using Intersectionality Theory as a Tool by which to Broaden Title VII to 
Recognize Appearance Discrimination in the Post 9/11 U.S.: 
After 9/11, the backlash against Muslims in the workplace significantly increased as 
employers policed and regulated the images of their employees in order to protect an all 
American non-Muslim corporate image.
62
  When employees filed claims with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC, alleging discrimination based on religion and 
national origin, employers defended their new policies on the grounds of legitimate business 
                                                            
61   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1073 (noting the changes to both Harrah’s grooming policies and other 
establishments due to pending litigation). 
62   See McCandless & Ngo, supra note 9, at 3-8 (referencing statistics showing a sharp increase in workplace 
discrimination Muslims after  9/11). 
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concerns.
63
  Broadly, employers defended their policies, stating that post 9/11, without such 
policies, their businesses would suffer due to a decline in customer satisfaction, confidence and 
overall professionalism.
64
   
In response to complaints filed by individuals alleging discrimination against them for 
being Muslims, the EEOC added a chapter to their Compliance Manual in an attempt to prevent 
employers from discriminating on the basis of national origins in a post 9/11 world.
65
  The 
EEOC reiterated the prohibition of discrimination against individuals based upon their religion 
and national origin, stating that aside from reasonably accommodating the religious practices of 
employees, employers are prohibited from discriminating against employees based on their 
“[p]hysical, linguistic or cultural traits [such as] their dress.”66  However, regardless of the 
attempts made by EEOC to prevent invidious discrimination against particularly Muslim 
employees or those perceived to be Muslim,
67
 most of the time such complaints have failed to 
meet the requisite level of proof in order to constitute Title VII discrimination.   
Claims brought by Plaintiffs under Title VII After 9/11: 
Many cases alleging unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII after 9/11 have 
been brought under religious discrimination.  However, a majority of these are resolved at the 
district level on summary judgment, finding for the employer.
68
  From the cases which were 
dismissed on summary judgment, the ones which were appealed and moved to the Appellate 
                                                            
63   See Shirin Sinnar, Trends in Post 9/11 Backlash Employment Discrimination, Address Before the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law Panel (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.bnabooks.com/ababna/eeo/2006/ 
sinnar.pdf. (stating legitimate business concerns included the adverse impact on a company’s public image and 
adverse impact to customer relations). 
64    See id. 
65   See McCandless & Ngo, supra note 9, at 8-9.   
66   See id. at 9. 
67   See Sinnar, supra note 66 (generally indicating that in the post 9/11 era, discrimination, harassment and violence 
against Sikhs have risen, because their beards and turbans were associated are being “Muslim”). 
68   See McCandless & Ngo, supra note 9, at 12. 
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level, the Courts overwhelmingly held that most of them involved “[n]ormal ‘workplace’ 
behavior and the alleged discriminatory events lacked a ‘direct nexus with religion.’”69  Even in 
cases where Courts have determined that the plaintiffs did demonstrate that they suffered the 
requisite level of severity or pervasiveness, they still have “…remanded cases for further 
consideration [in order to determine whether or not] the evidence indicated that the plaintiff 
suffered “religious harassment that was persistent, demeaning, unrelenting, and widespread.”70  
This is particularly apparent in cases brought by Muslim women, alleging unlawful employment 
discrimination based on their wearing of head coverings (hijabs) in the workplace.
71
   
In Ali v. Alamo Rent-A-Car Inc., the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint 
where she alleged religious discrimination under Title VII based upon defendant-employer’s 
policy which prohibited her from wearing a headscarf to work, on the grounds that a transfer to a 
position which did not require contact with customers did not constitute an adverse employment 
action.
72
  On appeal, plaintiff argued that discrimination based on religion is treated differently 
because of Tile VII’s definition of religion and therefore does not require a showing of adverse 
employment action taken by the employer.
73
  However, the Court rejected plaintiff’s argument.  
Instead, the Court viewed the burden on employees to show discrimination on the basis of 
religion as similar to their burden for showing discrimination based on sex, color, race or 
                                                            
69   See McCandless & Ngo, supra note 9, at 12 (citing EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 311-315 (4th 
Cir. 2008), where the Court held that constant remarks directed against an employee by co-workers and supervisors 
such as calling him “Taliban” or “towel-head”, actions such as holding metal detectors to his head, stealing his head 
covering and making fun of his overall appearance did not show religious motivated discrimination under Title VII). 
70  See id. at 12-14 (citing EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 311-318 (4th Cir. 2008); EEOC v. WC&M 
Enterprises, Inc., 496 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
71   See e.g. Ali v. Alamo Rent-A-Car Inc., 8 Fed. Appx. 156, 157-158 (4th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch 
Stores, Inc., 798 F.Supp. 1272 (U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D.Okla. 2011). 
72   See id. 
73   See Ali, 8 Fed. Appx. at 158 (quoting  42 U.S.C. §2000e(j), which defines  religion as including “all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief”). 
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national origin.
74
  Therefore, the Court ruled that in simply failing to accommodate an 
employee’s religious practice does not constitute religious discrimination under Title VII.75   
However, the Court did not give adequate weight to the fact that plaintiff, a management 
trainee who was hired to manage the front of the business, was transferred to a position where 
she would not have to interact with customers, even though that was a main requirement of her 
job and one of the main qualifications of her degree.
76
  Instead, since the employer did not 
terminate plaintiff from her position, the Court held the adverse impact she experienced, did not 
rise to the level of adverse employment action, as generally viewed in Title VII cases.
77
  The 
Court failed to give credence to the idea that the employer discriminated against plaintiff based 
on her appearance, because but for her head covering, according to the Court transcript, no other 
reason was indicated for transferring plaintiff to a different position.  The direct nexus between 
the discriminatory conduct and religion would have been established, had the Court recognized 
the existence of appearance based discrimination.  The link would indicate the assumption that a 
Muslim employee in a post 9/11 era, who is in a front desk position, should not “appear” 
differently than the Anglo-American ideal preferred by society.  Additionally, by appearing with 
religious apparel, her religious identity became apparent which some customers found 
unpalatable as they connected it with 9/11.  In this case,  assumptions based upon the employee’s 
religion and sex become combined because she was publicly aligning herself with her religion, 
by wearing the hijab and therefore her identity as a woman and Muslim both become open to 
perceptions as a whole.  
                                                            
74   See Ali, 8 Fed. Appx. at 158, at 159 (stating that “Title VII only prohibits employer practices where the employer 
discriminates on the basis of religion and the employee suffers an adverse employment action”). 
75  See id. at 158. 
76   See Ali, 8 Fed. Appx. at 159. 
77   See, e.g. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761-762 (1998); Faragher v. City. of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775, 786-787 (1998). 
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In EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., the District Court for the Northern District 
of Oklahoma the defendant, Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. brought forth a motion for 
summary judgment, to dismiss a religious discrimination claim brought by a Muslim teenager 
who applied for a job at an Abercrombie store in Woodland Hills Mall but was not hired.
78
  
Plaintiff alleged she was not hired because she wore a head scarf, which was explicitly 
prohibited “[b]y the Abercrombie ‘Look Policy, [which does not permit] sales models from 
wearing head wear.”79  Ultimately, the District Court denied Abercrombie’s motion for summary 
judgment, finding that they had not rebutted the plaintiff’s prima facie case and therefore 
allowing plaintiff’s case to continue.80   
However, even as the Court took a broad view of what constituted a deeply held religious 
belief, the Court avoided setting such a precedent for treating religious- based discrimination 
based on appearance in this manner.  The Court’s analysis accomplished this in two ways.  First, 
footnote 12 of the decision cautioned that despite its decision, “Abercrombie may be able to 
show undue hardship in other hijab cases.”81  In conjunction with the first point, in criticizing 
Abercrombie’s “look policy,” the Court did not question the viability of Abercrombie’s “look 
policy”.  The decision was not so revolutionary because the Court failed to recognize the validity 
of discrimination based on appearance as it did not view the “look policy” as setting forth a 
particular standard of appearance to which exceptions, while permitted, are mostly not granted.
82
   
By failing to recognize the inherently discriminatory policy put in place by Abercrombie, 
the Court focused on the plaintiff’s head dress as a symbol of her religious beliefs, setting the 
                                                            
78  See EEOC, 798 F.Supp, at 1275-1276. 
79  See id. at 1275-1276. 
80  See EEOC, 798 F.Supp, at 1287. 
81  See id. 
82  See EEOC, 798 F.Supp, at 1280-1281. 
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stage for the ultimate dismissal of the action.
83
  This occurred because plaintiff could not 
demonstrate that wearing a head dress is a “bona fide religious belief” within the definition set 
forth under Title VII,
84
 as neither Islamic teachings nor religious observance directly require 
women to cover their heads, which Courts focus on in deciding religious discrimination cases.
85
  
In addition, plaintiff was unable to defeat claims of undue hardship asserted by her employer, as 
Courts since 2001 have accepted most reasons as legitimate and leading to “…more than a de 
minimus cost” thereby exempting the employer from accommodating the religious belief of an 
employee.
86
  The only way to recognize and ultimately allow a plaintiff to prevail against an 
appearance or look policy such as Abercrombie & Fitch’s, would be to recognize:  (i) the 
pervasiveness of appearance discrimination and (ii) its ability to become intertwined with 
traditional forms of discrimination, creating a new hybrid form of discrimination which cannot 
be remedied by traditional methods. 
Using Intersectionality Theory to Identify New Hybrid Forms of Discrimination: 
 
In order to curtail new forms of discrimination, which manifest themselves through 
appearance-based policies in an employment context, new hybrid forms of discrimination need 
to gain recognition as viable forms through which employers discriminate against employees.  
Legal recognition is a precursor to providing legal remedies for such forms of discrimination.  A 
method which recognizes the existence and problems posed to the legal rights of employees 
                                                            
83  See, e.g., Ali, 8 Fed. Appx. 156, 157-158 (4th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Geo Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 291-292 (3rd 
Cir. 2010); Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 263-264 (3rd Cir. 2009) (indicating that the Federal Court of 
Appeals in different circuits have overwhelmingly dismissed Title VII religious discrimination claims brought on 
the basis of discrimination of appearance, on the grounds that plaintiff did not adequately state a prima facie case for 
discrimination under Title VII). 
84  See EEOC, 798 F. Supp at 1283, supra note 74 (where a “bona fide religious belief’ is one that (1) is religious 
within the plaintiff’s own scheme of things and (2) is sincerely held”). 
85  See id at 1284 (asserting that Courts can interpret “bona fide religious belief” objectively or subjectively). 
86  See EEOC, 798 F. Supp at 1287 (citing Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., 22 F.3d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir. 1994) and Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)). 
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through hybrid forms of discrimination is Intersectionality Theory, espoused by Professor 
Kimberle Crenshaw.
87
    
Professor Crenshaw suggests that there is a “problematic consequence [with treating] 
race and gender and mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis,”88 in anti-
discrimination studies.  By viewing “race” and “sex” as separate categories and therefore 
separate modes through which discrimination is perpetrated, the analytical framework only 
accepts that individuals experience discrimination because of one aspect of identity, i.e. race or 
sex.  Framing discrimination through, as Professor Crenshaw terms, a “single-axis framework,”89 
precludes individuals from obtaining relief for discrimination claims which do not fall within the 
aforementioned neatly structured categories.  Working within a one-dimensional view of 
discrimination “marginalizes [individuals] who are multiply-burdened and obscured claims that 
cannot be understood as resulting from discrete sources of discrimination.”90 
To illustrate the problems which arise by not recognizing the intersection between race 
and sex in the legal sphere, Professor Crenshaw focuses on judicial treatment of Black women 
plaintiffs by the Courts in Title VII cases.
91
  Professor Crenshaw’s discussion of three cases92 
highlights the inability of Courts to recognize hybrid forms of discrimination, because plaintiffs 
“cannot combine statutory remedies to create a new ‘super-remedy’ which would give them 
                                                            
87  See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 139 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57-80 (1989). 
88  See id. at 57. 
89  See Kimberle Crenshaw, supra note 88, at 57-58. 
90  See id. at 58  (arguing that focus on a single-axis framework excludes Black women in antiracist policy and 
discussion because it does not take into account the total experiences and discrimination faced by Black women 
based upon both their race and their gender). 
91  See Kimberle Crenshaw, supra note 88, at 58-63 (highlighting the inadequate remedies available for Black 
women plaintiffs because of a lack of judicial recognition of the double discrimination faced by the plaintiffs 
because of their race and sex in Title VII cases). 
92   See id. (citing DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, 413 F. Supp 142, 142-145 (E.D. Mo. 1976), Moore v., Hughes 
Helicopters, 708 F.2d 475, 475-486 (9th Cir. 1983) and Payne v. Travenol Labratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 789-842 
(5th Cir. 1982)). 
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relief beyond what the drafters of the relevant statues intended,”93  The Court declined to accept 
that a combination of both sex and race discrimination can be brought by a group of plaintiffs 
whose discrimination claim is only viable because of the intersection and resulting experiences 
which stem from race and sex.
94
  The Court interpreted the plaintiffs’ bringing sex and race 
discrimination as a single cause of action, as creating “new classes of protected minorities 
[created only through the] mathematical principles of permutation and combination”, for the sole 
purpose of increasing their standing.”95  This perspective misses the point entirely.  Plaintiffs did 
not push to bring a discrimination claim on the basis of sex and race in order to obtain greater 
standing.  Instead, they pushed, because independently, their status as women and status as 
Blacks, did not entitle them protection under Title VII since General Motors employed both 
white women and black men.
96
  Therefore, while there would be no independent grounds to 
prove it, the employer logically could not discriminate against Black women because both of 
their “identities” independently were not discriminated against by General Motors.   
The Court’s failure to conceptualize discrimination in a multi-dimensional way is also 
problematic because it assumes a white-centric notion towards different types of 
discrimination.
97
  While Moore, a Black female plaintiff was unable to bring forth her 
discrimination claim as a black woman because her race would not allow her to represent white 
women employees, Professor Crenshaw argues that white women employees are not thought to 
be prohibited from bringing forward sex discrimination claims, because their race prevents them 
                                                            
93  See DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp 142 at 143. 
94  See id. at 145 (asserting that “the goal of [Title VII] was [not] to create a new classification of ‘black women’ 
who would have greater standing than, for example, a black male”). 
95  See DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp 142 at 145. 
96  See Kimberle Crenshaw, supra note 93, at 59. 
97  See Moore, 708 F.2d at 480 (where, because plaintiff asserted a cause of action under Title VII as a Black female, 
because of her reliance on both sex and race, her claim was dismissed because her race would not allow her to 
‘adequately represent’ white women employees). 
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from understanding the experiences of women of other races.
98
  Therefore, Courts pegged 
standards for demonstrating discrimination in sex and race discrimination cases based on the 
discrimination and experiences felt by white individuals.
99
  Presenting this as the general norm or 
standard through which discrimination claims under Title VII are assessed, disadvantages 
minorities.  By failing to recognize their particular experiences stemming from the intersection of 
their race and sex, plaintiffs are doubly disadvantaged, since they are prevented from presenting 
their claims in an effective manner.
100
  In Moore, unable to bring a claim on the behalf of all 
women and all Blacks, in order to demonstrate unlawful discrimination on the grounds that the 
employer would not promote African women employees, she could only rely on statistical 
evidence relating to the promotions given to Blacks and not Black women, of which there were 
little to none promoted.
101
  Limiting the plaintiff from the relevant evidence in order to state her 
Title VII claim, the Court essentially “erased”102 her unique experiences and right to raise a 
complaint. 
A one-dimensional view of discrimination presents contradictions in the law.
103
  In 
reviewing the Courts decisions in DeGraffenreid and Moore, she notes that Black women are 
viewed inconsistently by the law, as the former decision “refused to acknowledge that the 
employment of Black women can be distinct from that of white women, while [in the latter], 
                                                            
98   See Kimberle Crenshaw, supra note 93, at 60. 
99  See id. (asserting that “discrimination against a white female [has become] the standard sex discrimination 
claim”). 
100  See Kimberle Crenshaw, supra note 93, at 61. 
101 See Moore, 708 F.2d at 484-486 (demonstrating that the limitations placed by the Court on plaintiff’s claim and 
thus admissible evidence because of their failure to recognize her unique claim of discrimination rendered her 
without redress.  Due to the limitations, she was unable to use relevant statistical evidence to show that a qualified 
Black woman not given a supervisory role by an employer, who permitted Black men and white women similar 
supervisory roles, constituted unlawful employment discrimination because offering roles to individuals on the basis 
of race or sex does not relieve the employer from discriminating against the individuals who constitute both the race 
and sex). 
102  See Kimberle Crenshaw, supra note 102, at 61-62. 
103  See id. at 63 (highlighting the contradictions which arise when the Courts decisions in DeGraffenreid and Moore 
are viewed together). 
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Black women were harmed because [their] claims were…so distinct from the claims of white 
women.”104  Such contradictions towards Black women, Professor Crenshaw stipulates, are 
somewhat resolved by viewing discrimination as multi-dimensional, where an individual can 
experience discrimination from a single or many different directions.
105
  Only recognizing one 
single form through which discrimination can occur, disables the relief available to Black women 
and limits their legal identity.  While they share experiences with both white women and Black 
men, they experience a unique, hybrid form of discrimination stemming from “the combined 
effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race and on the basis of sex.”106  Since 
Black women are able to experience discrimination on the basis of two types of invidious 
classifications (their race and their sex), their ability claim discrimination on both of their legal 
identities, should logically be recognized. 
In sum, Professor Crenshaw advocates that in order to recognize discrimination against 
Black women based on the intersection of their sex and race-based identities, discrimination 
needs to be viewed as multi-dimensional. Rather than recognizing new classes of minorities, 
legally accepting hybrid forms of discrimination based on dual classifications such as sex and 
race, which have historically been intertwined, is the most viable way to protect individuals who 
fall outside of the purview and thus protections offered by Title VII.  While primarily used in 
race studies, I propose an extension to this theory towards two other historically intertwined 
categories:  sex and religion.   
 
                                                            
104  See Kimberle Crenshaw, supra note 102, at 63. 
105  See id. (comparing discrimination to traffic flowing from all directions, where discrimination can be reached by 
travelling in one direction, or alternatively, from several directions, all of which merge and produce a cumulative 
affect). 
106  See Kimberle Crenshaw, supra note 102, at 63-64. 
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Critiques of Intersectionality Theory: 
Contrary to Professor Crenshaw’s proposal to remedy the approach to discrimination, 
many scholars doubt the viability of intersectionality theory.
107
  The main critique which scholars 
articulate is the lack of a clearly defined intersectional methodology affecting the theory’s 
viability.  This is so because in accepting the existence of the interaction of multiple individual 
identities without recognizing a way to understand these intersections, remedies for intersectional 
based discrimination are severely limited.
108
  As Nash asserts, “[w]hile intersectionality has 
worked to disrupt [historical] approaches to identity…and problematize social processes of 
categorization through [a focus on] marginalized subjects’ experiences, intersectional projects 
often replicate precisely the approaches that they critique.”109  Focusing on Professor Crenshaw’s 
discussion of the intersection of race and sex in discrimination claims, Nash questions the 
limitating of black women’s identities solely to race and gender.110   
While a relevant critique, Professor Crenshaw’s use of the Black woman as a type of 
doubly-discriminated against subject while potentially unifying the experiences of all black 
women, must be regarded in a contextual basis.   Owing to her focus on race-based politics and 
identity, she focused on the intersection between race and sex. However, she does not indicate 
that additional burdens do not play a role in disadvantaging black women.  Within the context of 
anti-discrimination law under Title VII however, the intersection between race and sex serve as 
                                                            
107  See Jennifer C. Nash, Re-Thinking Intersectionality, 89 FEMINIST REV. 1, 2 (2008). 
108  See Robert S. Chang & Jerome M. Culp, After Intersectionality, 71 U. MO.-KAN. CITY. L. REV. 485, 485-486 
(2002). 
109   See Jennifer C. Nash, supra note 108, at 6 (discussing the inconsistency in intersectionality theory with a focus 
on Professor Kimberle Crenshaw’s discussion of the treatment of sex and race based claims in anti-discrimination 
law). 
110   See id. at 7 (arguing that while Professor Crenshaw argues for the law to recognize black women and doubly-
burdened in discrimination claims, she does not examine the other ways in which they are disadvantaged, such as 
through sexuality, nationality, or class). 
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the two most important indicators and precursors of the biases and attitudes leading to 
discrimination, which is why both of the aforementioned categories are Professor Crenshaw’s 
main focus.  In addition, for a black woman, the legal basis upon which unlawful discrimination 
in the workplace occurs would be mainly geared towards her identity as a woman and her 
identity as African-American.
111
 
Another critique leveled at Professor Crenshaw’s discussion on intersectionality theory is 
her focus on the black woman, as a “unitary and monolithic entity.”112  However, in the narrow 
context of anti-discrimination law, the “black woman” is a prototype.  It serves as a medium for 
understanding intersectionality theory.  While intersectionality may be problematic if viewed 
solely as a means to advance black feminism,
113
 as a broader notion, it allow for the law to take 
into account the cultural, social, religious, race and other identities which make-up individuals.  
This in theory should permit discriminations claims to be broadly tailored to reach all types of 
plaintiffs.  
Recognizing the Intersection between Sex and Religion to Address a new hybrid form of 
discrimination 
 
As with race and sex, the religious and sex based identities of women allow for shared 
experiences which develop as a result of both of their identities.  In evaluating post 9/11 
discrimination claims against Muslim women, the combination of religion and sex serves as a 
dual basis for employment discrimination.  As the law does not recognize this intersection, Title 
VII provides no legal recourse and thus such plaintiffs are doubly-discriminated against and 
                                                            
111  See Jennifer C. Nash, supra note 111, at 7-8 (recognizing that despite the absence of other bases through which 
black women are burdened, in discrimination claims, black women primarily receive injuries based on their sex and 
race). 
112  See id. at 8. 
113  See Jennifer C. Nash, supra note 108, at 9 (highlighting the general use of intersectionality theory to shed further 
light and advance black feminism). 
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marginalized.  Recognition of this link is crucial in increasing Title VII’s effectiveness against 
discrimination perpetuated against minorities.
114
 
Applying the principles of Intersectionality, there is an intersection between sex and 
religion in appearance based policies implemented by employers.  Accepting that an intersection 
exists between sex and religion presents a viable alternative to achieving a two-fold goal.  It aids 
in analyzing hybrid forms of discrimination in the workplace and simultaneously legitimizes the 
need for remedying these new hybrid forms of discrimination.  The intersection demonstrates 
that women with deeply held religious beliefs, which manifest themselves through appearance, 
experience discrimination which is not “[w]ithin the traditional boundaries of [religion] or 
gender discrimination as these boundaries are currently understood and [the] 
intersection…factors into the lives of [religious] women in ways that cannot be captured wholly 
by looking at [religion] or gender dimensions of those experiences separately.”115   
As with the Court’s assessment of discrimination claims brought by plaintiffs on the 
grounds of sex and race, without giving credence to the idea that the discrimination on the 
grounds of religion and sex has a different impact compared to discrimination on either category, 
Title VII does not provide adequate grounds through which plaintiffs can seek redress.
116
   
 
 
                                                            
114  See Kimberle Crenshaw, supra note 106. 
115  See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against Women 
of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1993). 
116   See Kimberle Crenshaw, supra note 93 (reflecting upon the Courts narrow interpretation of the scope of 
discrimination present in Title VII, discounting the viability of discrimination claims brought on the basis of race 
and sex). 
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Part IV: Amending Title VII to Remedy Discrimination Claims based on a 
Combination of Religion and Sex           
Recognizing the existence of appearance discrimination and its ability to be used as a 
vehicle through which to effectuate employment discrimination, it is necessary to amend Title 
VII to reflect such changes.  Prohibitions on appearance discrimination can and have taken shape 
through statutory ordinances in different states.  However, due to a lack of enforcement, their 
impact is smaller than anticipated.
117
  In order for such prohibitions to be more effective, Title 
VII itself should be amended to include appearance discrimination based on religious 
stereotypes, as unlawful discrimination in an employment context.   
Examining the language of the various ordinances banning appearance discrimination in 
an employment context, serves as a tool to determine how to fashion an effective amendment to 
Title VII.  Most jurisdictions which have prohibited some form of appearance discrimination in 
the workplace through ordinances, focus on discrimination based on height and weight.
118
  The 
remedies available to employees who face discrimination based on their height and weight 
differs, depending upon the severity of the discrimination and whether or not jurisdictions have 
only civil or criminal penalties available.
119
  However, as Rhode asserts, while cities such as San 
Francisco and states such as the District of Columbia included in their human rights law,
120
 
discrimination in the workplace based on personal appearance, “[t]hey have reported relatively 
little enforcement activity despite…broad remedial provisions.”121    
                                                            
117    See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1095.   
118    See id. (referencing statutes from Michigan, District of Columbia, Santa Cruz, Madison and San Francisco, out 
of which Michigan’s is the most restrictive). 
119    See Rhode,  supra note 6, at 1082-1083  (showing that remedies vary greatly, awarding fines for discrimination 
based on height and weight as low as $500.00 to a possible recovery of $50,000, and even criminal penalties if such 
prohibitions constitute a violation of a jurisdictions human rights law); see e.g. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12A.1 
(2008). 
120   See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.01 (LexisNexis 2008). 
121   See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1084. 
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The language used in the District of Columbia’s ordinance prohibiting discrimination, 
including those based on appearance, would be useful if placed instead in Title VII.  While Title 
VII bars unlawful employment discrimination based on sex, race, color, religion and national 
origin
122
, in order to prohibit appearance-based discrimination, additional language such as 
“[d]iscrimination by reason of…personal appearance” is required.123  Personal appearance, as 
defined in the statute includes “the outward appearance of any person…with regard to bodily 
condition or characteristics, manner or style of dress and manner or style of personal grooming, 
including, but not limited to hair style and beards,”124   
However, the broad scope of the ordinance’s definition of personal appearance could 
prove overly burdensome on employers who would be faced with the prospect of litigation over 
anything termed personal appearance.
125
  This is one of the main reasons, arguably, why the 
violations for discrimination based on personal appearance are not as strictly enforced despite the 
broad remedial powers granted in the ordinance and do not survive motions to dismiss.
126
  There 
is a need to effectively amend Title VII, using a narrowly tailored definition of what constitutes 
religious apparel and symbols.  In doing so, the interests of employees who adorn religious 
outerwear would be protected, without unduly burdening employers by subjecting them to 
frivolous lawsuits and ambiguous legislation. 
Alternatively, personal appearance could be defined in a manner similar to the local 
ordinance in Howard County, Maryland, which included within personal appearance to 
                                                            
122   See Title VII, supra note 1. 
123   See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.01. 
124   See id. § 2-1401.02(22). 
125   See, e.g., McManus v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 952-954 (D.C. 2000). 
126   See, e.g., Underwood v. Archer Management Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1994); Turcois v. U.S. Serv. 
Indus., 680 A.2d 1023 (D.C. 1996); Kennedy v. District of Columbia, 654 A.2d 847 (D.C. 1994); Kennedy v. Barry, 
516 A.2d 176 (D.C. 1986); Honig v. D.C. Office of Human Rights, 388 A.2d 887 (D.C. 1978). 
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“[e]ncompass ‘outward appearance of a person with regard to hair style, facial hair, physical 
characteristics or manner of dress.’”127   The ordinance further stipulated exceptions to 
prohibiting discrimination in the workplace based on personal appearance should be cleanliness 
of an individual as well as their work attire.
128
   
However, it is espoused that an amendment to Title VII should include language 
stipulating that discrimination based on personal appearance, which reflects on religious 
stereotyping should be prohibited.  Adding such a caveat to a definition of personal appearance 
will target policies which discriminate based on appearance in the workplace, and will allow 
employers to set reasonable appearance policies without impinging on the religious and other 
deeply held beliefs of their workers.  Grooming policies and professional codes of conduct 
should not include the following categories as reflecting “clean cut” appearances:  braided hair, 
weaves, hair extensions, head coverings, yarmulkes, corn rolls, turbans and beards.  This will 
allow the amendment to achieve the maximum benefit for plaintiff-employees without unduly 
burdening employers.  While the aforementioned list is not exhaustive, it demonstrates that 
essentially, an amendment to Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on religious apparel 
should contain within it a list of recognized religious apparel and symbols.   
Listing the particular religious apparel which cannot be used in job evaluations, employee 
assessments or in creating professional codes of conduct would put employers on notice as to 
what would constitute discrimination.  Additionally, a list of religious symbols aids in 
discrimination causes of action because the presence or absence of such religious apparel would 
allow a plaintiff to establish a presumption of religious and sex based discrimination by way of 
                                                            
127    See COUNTY OF HOWARD, MD., CODE§§12.200(II) (1992)). 
128    See id. §§12.201(XVI)  (1992). 
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appearance.  Conversely, employers would be required to show a business necessity limited to 
the health and safety of its other employees, to rebut this presumption and therefore, in theory, 
only viable claims of discrimination would proceed through the judicial system.  Referencing the 
loss of sales and dissatisfaction of customers without additional evidence should not be 
considered credible by the Courts.  A list of religious symbols which employers should not be 
able to consider in employment policies should be limited to those used “[w]ith regard to hair 
style, facial hair, physical characteristics or manner of dress.”129   
In sum, an amendment to Title VII which would enable plaintiffs to have standing to 
pursue hybrid discriminatory claims based on the overall experiences that stem from their 
religion and sex, would be extremely beneficial.  It would improve their ability to pursue a cause 
of action tailored to their specific discrimination without being barred from accessing relevant 
statistics and other evidence.  Additionally, it would allow for some form of appearance based 
discrimination to be recognized as discrimination within the scope of discrimination discourse as 
being invidious in nature.  The most obvious and invidious form of religious and sex based 
discrimination occurs through stereotypes stemming from society’s perception of appearance.  
Outward manifestations of religious belief aid in influencing perceptions and the formation of 
such stereotypes.  Stereotypes and perceptions which lead to discrimination based upon the 
religious appearance of individuals in an employment context and cannot be tolerated.  In order 
to best protect the rights of female employees with deeply held religious beliefs in the workplace, 
an amendment to Title VII is required. 
 
                                                            
129  See COUNTY OF HOWARD, MD., CODE§§12.200(II), 12.201(XIV)  (1992) (describing Howard County’s definition 
of “personal appearance” in their statute prohibiting forms of appearance discrimination in an employment context). 
 
